Assistance with bathing at home for older and disabled people has long been an area of service tension and ambiguity. Lying across the principal faultline of community care, that of the medical/social divide, it is at the heart of current debates over welfare provision. But exploring the meaning of the 'social bath', as it is termed in the field, also challenges some of the traditional ways in which community care has been described and analysed particularly within the discipline of social policy. Bathing involves the negotiation of intimacy and the management of the body, and as such entails aspects of being and of social exchange that have not traditionally been part of the standard, rather rationalistic and disembodied account of social policy. Part of the aim of the paper is to redress this omission.
position, for a 'social bath' as it is termed in the field, is itself defined in negative terms: the sort of bath that the community nursing service does not provide: it is social. Bathing thus lies across the principal fault line of community care: that between the medical and the social; and as such, is positioned at the focus of current conflicts within the care system. But bathing also touches on aspects that are not normally incorporated into policy debate, such as washing, touching, nakedness and the management of the body. These form the social reality of bathing, though they are little talked about in the policy and managerial literature. Exploring the nature of bathing thus challenges some of the ways in which community care provision has traditionally be presented and discussed.
In this article I will analyse and deconstruct the three axes within which the 'social bath' is defined. The first relates to the institutional and ideological setting, in the form of the medical/social boundary. The second concerns what is done, exploring the nature of washing, touching, nakedness in the context of service provision. The third axis concerns the site where these activities take place: the home.
T H E M E D I C A L / S O C I A L B O U N DA RY
The boundary between the medical and the social is a shifting one, constructed in complex ways that reflect both institutional and ideological factors.
Institutional factors
Across modern welfare systems the boundary of medical and social care is an area of tension, where it falls a product of different institutional histories and different underlying philosophies of welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pierson, 1991) . The boundary is not defined in a single, simple way but constructed by a series of overlapping distinctions in which payment, nature of care, and locus of responsibility reinforce and interact with each other in complex ways, and that themselves change through time. Long-term care falls across the boundary of medical and social, indeed the fact that the health-care needs so identified are long term and chronic is important in their construction as semi-social. The rising proportion of older people in the population and growing anxieties among policy-makers and politicians as to the future funding of their support has resulted in pressure to redefine the nature of the care of these groups and to shift its locus out of the medical and into the social sector. As we shall see, this recasting of chronic need as in some sense social in character is closely related to the question of payment.
As cost pressures have borne down on the NHS there has been a tendency for the institution to retreat back to the medical heartlands of acute hospital care. Within the institutional culture, this represents 'real medicine', the territory whose status is high and unambiguous, as opposed to the grey areas of long-term and community based care whose status is low and whose legitimacy as part of medicine less certain. Hightech intervention, orientation to cure, clear locus within the hospital, all characterise this medical heartland. The boundary between the medical and the social thus overlaps significantly with the boundary within health care itself between high-status medicine and what is seen simply as 'care'. Chronic conditions where there is little prospect of cure and few opportunities for medical intervention are relegated to the territory of care. As medicine retreats in its institutional basis, so these areas of longterm care are exposed as marginal, capable to some degree of being reconstituted as social care. The retreat of medicine from the area of long-term care is not simply a negative one but results also from countervailing forces asserting the importance of the social. Concern with the over-medicalisation of life problems arises out of the critiques of modern medicine made by Illich and others from the 1960s and 1970s (Illich, 1975; Doyle, 1979) . In recent years these arguments have been advanced particularly strongly by the disability lobby who reject the dominance of the medical model both in terms of the definition of disability and the model of care (Morris, 1991 , Oliver, 1990 . Similar ideas underwrite the emphasis on normalisation within learning disability, with its desire to throw off medical dominance and assert instead the primacy of ordinary life (Ryan and Thomas, 1987) . In relation to older people the issue has been less ideologically driven, but the influence of these ideas has still been felt and underwrites current debates as to where the boundary of medical and social care should lie.
The medical/social boundary needs to be understood in terms of public versus private responsibilities. Across welfare systems, medical care is recognised as having a special legitimacy. There is a wide acceptance that it is something that should be available to the individual free from direct concern over cost. In many systems this translates directly into the provision of medical care free at the point of use. The assumption is not a universal one and medical care in the US offers an example of a much more clearly commodified system. Even here, however, there are elements of recognition that medical care is not simply a consumption good. The special status of medical care lies in contrast to that of social care, where the legitimacy of public provision is weaker. Social care is part of social life, and as such it represents something that you are primarily expected to pay for yourself. Welfare states differ in the degree to which they regard social care as a private as opposed to collective responsibility; and that boundary is differently drawn in, for example, Sweden as opposed to Germany or the United States (Lesemann and Martin, 1993; Glendinning and McLaughlin, 1993; Evers, 1994) . All systems, however, retain some sense of social care as an area of personal responsibility.
It is this traditional assumption that underlies the current -though still unacknowledged -attempt by the government in the UK, though also in other countries, to move the costs of long-term care away from the publicly funded sector of health care and into the arena of social care, which is increasingly seen as one where the individual must expect to fund him or herself. The broad distinction between free health care and self-funded or means-tested social care has become increasingly sharp in Britain as local authorities have moved towards charging for the principal services of community care -home, day and respite care -previously provided free or on a varying but nearly always non-commercial basis. The division between health and social care is increasingly a division between care that is free to the individual and that which has to be funded from his or her own purse.
The sharpening of the boundary between medical and social care at a national level has been reinforced by developments at the front line of provision (Wistow, et al. 1994; Butcher, 1995; Lewis and Glennerster, 1996) . One of the consequences of the purchaser/provider split in the UK is that patterns of payment and responsibility have become more transparent. Exactly who does what is increasingly defined not by institutional structures but directly in flows of money.
In parallel with these institutional changes have gone changes in culture. The rise of the new managerialism in both health and social services has resulted in an emphasis on explicit targets and focused provision (Stewart, 1986) . Managers have attempted to clarify the aims and objectives of their organisations and with it the remit of various workers. This means defining in a much more overt way exactly what is provided for whom and by which staff. Traditionally the activities of front line care workers have been marked by some discretion. As Lipsky notes, discretion, far from being the prerogative of high status professionals, is exercised by a variety of front line workers in the human service field (Lipsky, 1980) . Home helps, community nurses, home care aides, all traditionally exercise some discretion over what they do and for whom, and it is in this territory of discretion that the 'social bath' is located.
Traditionally the 'social bath' has represented an area where policy is uncertain. In the past, managers in both health and social services have seldom been able to give a clear answer as to whether bathing was available or not (Twigg, 1990) . To some degree bathing in the community occupies a policy vacuum, a grey area of provision, as yet uncolonised by the new managerial specificity; and we shall return later to some of the features of the managerial tradition that have led it to avoid a more direct engagement with the subject of bathing. But the social bath also represents an area of discretion in which policy remains deliberately blurred. The basis for this discretion was slightly different as between the home care and district nursing services.
The home help service, formed as it was around the model of housework, traditionally stopped short of intimate care (Dexter and Harbert, 1983; Means and Smith, 1985) . But it has always been recognised that some home helps were happy to give assistance in this area and clients appreciated their aid. What underwrote this aspect of discretion was an implicit recognition of the interpersonal element: certain home helps giving help to certain clients (Twigg, 1990) . Help was negotiated on a personal basis where, in the absence of an officially defined role, the home help took on that of a member of the family, someone close and known to the client. Home helps, when going beyond their prescribed duties, typically draw on familial models, reconstructing their relationship with favoured clients as one of a daughter or daughter-in-law (Warren, 1988 (Warren, , 1990 . By contrast, the district nursing service has always recognised bathing as part of its professional remit, but has been reluctant to acknowledge it as a specific service openly available. Here the aspect of discretion is rooted in the issue of case loads and the flexible use of staff. Bathing where combined with other more technical nursing tasks was possible: alone, it was only rarely so, and typically on an episodic basis, fitted in as might be. What has happened under the impact of the changes of the last decade is that the nursing service has retreated, without any corresponding advance by social services. The sharpening of the medical/social divide, the renewed emphasis on acute provision, and the pressure on community services, have all created a situation where the nursing service does not see bathing as part of its role. On the social care side, the fragmentation of services and the growing significance of payment has resulted in a situation where bathing appears not to be widely available. As a result, what was previously provided on a patchy, idiosyncratic basis is now increasingly not provided at all.
Ideological factors
So far we have explored the institutional and organisational factors that define the boundary between the medical and the social. These need, however, to be located within a larger ideological context. At an ideological level the relationship between the medical and the social is an unequal and asymmetrical one in which the medical is the dominant category, associated with high status knowledge, technological mastery, political and social prestige. Estes and Binney among others have demonstrated how a series of interconnecting ideological and social structures underwrite and reinforce the power of the biomedical model (Estes and Binney, 1989) . And yet at the same time 'the social' is clearly a larger and more important category: it, after all, encompasses the whole of society and all social aspects of being. The significance of this is however played down within the discourse of public provision, and the social assigned a merely residual and lesser status.
There is a second sense in which the relationship is asymmetrical. The medical regards the social world as its setting, the background to its practice. To this degree the medical is less a discrete territory than that all aspects of life are potentially subject to the medical gaze in some degree. This dominance of the medical is of course open to challenge, and has been challenged in various alternative discourses. The important point here however is that the medical and the social exist not simply separately and in parallel, but in an asymmetrical relationship.
Particular legitimacy adheres to the medical. As we noted earlier in relation to payment, there is a widespread acceptance that medical needs are real needs and ones that should at some level be met by society. To define a problem as medical is to place it within a policy discourse that is privileged. To demonstrate, for example, that poverty makes people ill is politically contentious, as the furore around the publication of the Black Report made plain (Townsend and Davidson, 1982) , because of the peculiar legitimacy that attaches to questions of health. Simply to talk of poverty does not have the same political resonance.
From this discussion we can draw out three strands: first, that the medical and the social exist in an asymmetrical relationship in which the medical is the marked category and the social the unmarked, residual one; second, that the medical gaze constitutes and defines the field; and third, that the medical is legitimated and the social optional. Armed with these perceptions we can now return to the significance of the 'social bath'.
The first thing to note is the absence of any terminology of the 'medical bath'. Reversing the previous asymmetry, it is the social that is asserted here. It is a 'social bath' that poses difficulties and that the community nursing service does not provide. But what sense in this context could one make of a 'medical bath'? Few conditions require bathing as such.
Some require a clean patient and many will involve patients who cannot clean themselves, but how far not having a bath as such represents a threat to health status is far from clear. We can perhaps assume some relationship between washing and health, but the association is not a clear-cut one and, as we shall see below, the significance of bathing is not exhausted by the question of hygiene.
Bathing where provided by the community nursing service is best understood not in terms of a medical bath as such, so much as a means of creating the proper setting for medical treatment. A clean patient is like a clean home, part of the necessary background to nursing care. In the absence of a medical intervention this background ceases to be relevant. Bathing provision within the community nursing service is therefore defined in terms of two factors: an ideology of medical dominance in which the social is the setting for practice and the medical gaze constitutes the field; and an institutional concern with the rationality of provision whereby it is possible to give a bath to the client where it can be fitted in and where a nurse is already calling to provide other more clearly medical forms of help.
Lastly, as we have noted above, to say that something is 'medical' in a policy oriented setting is to say that it is important and that the needs related to it should be met. To say it is 'social' is to say it is less urgent, more optional, a matter of personal responsibility and preference. It is in this context that we have to understand the terminology of bathing. To term a bath 'social' is to suggest that it is not absolutely necessary, that it is a pleasant option, something a person might enjoy but not something that really must be provided. And increasingly, of course, it is something that is not provided.
W H AT I S D O N E

Bathing
Bathing and washing have a long, complex, and until recently, relatively hidden history. I shall draw on this to suggest the way in which washing is not a straightforward, universal or common-sense procedure. Meaning and practice have shifted historically, so that what may seem obvious and assumed today should not necessarily be so.
The idea of bathing as a means of getting clean did not crystallise until the mid nineteenth century. Material developments were important in this: the arrival of the fixed, self-emptying bathtub and with it the dedicated bath room; piped hot water that made possible the use of soap; the development of inexpensive cosmetic, oil based soaps that could be used on the body as opposed to tallow ones that had previously only been used on clothes (Bushman and Bushman, 1988; Wilkie, 1986) . The rise of bathing is closely linked with the growth of material prosperity. Britain and America led the way in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when baths and advanced plumbing became self-consciously regarded as part of the advance of Anglo-Saxon civilisation (Giedion, 1948; Wilkie, 1986) . The association of American culture in particular with bathing and cleanliness continued to resonate in France into the 1950s (Ross, 1995) . The cultural diffusion of bathing was thus closely linked with economic development. In a parallel way baths spread down the social scale becoming a standard element in new working-class housing in America by the early years of the century and in Britain by the 1930s (Daunton, 1983; Swenarton, 1977) . Hot water however continued to be expensive, and bathing remained embedded within a discourse of class superiority in Britain well into recent memory.
Material and economic developments were not the sole sources of change. The elision of bathing and washing that is commonplace now was absent in the past also because cleanliness was achieved by other means and its significance subject to different interpretation. In the early modern period water was believed to be dangerous to the body and cleanliness was pursued by frequent changes of linen and by techniques of dry washing such as rubbing down with a cloth or brushes (Vignarello, 1988; Bushman and Bushman, 1988) . Concern over cleanliness itself shifted, and Vignarello charts the transition from a courtly preoccupation with washing just the face and hands, through a focus on clean linen and only in the nineteenth century with concern over the body itself.
Just as washing has its history, so too and in separate ways has bathing. Historically the bath has been located within a series of discourses of which the discourse of hygiene is not the sole or even the dominant one. I shall refer to these briefly in order to suggest that these alternatives themes are still present in muted form in relation to the modern bath and contribute to its meaning and significance.
Bathing has a long connection with luxury and sensuality. With the closing of the medieval public bathhouses, this tradition became a minor and aristocratic one, sustained only by the rich. The nineteenth-century importation of Turkish baths partly revived the tradition of luxurious social bathing (Giedion, 1948) . In recent years this theme of luxury has re-emerged, though in an entirely privatised form, with the spread of material prosperity which has permitted the development for the population in general of luxurious bathrooms, of second and en-suite bathrooms, of hot tubs and jacuzzis. These bathroom goods are promoted in a context of luxury and domestic sensuality, and bathing presented as part of a world of indulgence and pleasure. The considerable growth in bathroom preparations -creams, soaps, lotions, gels -underwrites the association.
Bathing is located within a discourse of stress. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, baths were promoted as a source of relaxation and recovery in the context of the tensions and stresses of modern life, especially as they developed in the competitive and anomic world of the great cities. The theme of relaxation and the relief of tension remains strong today, and can again be traced in the current promotion of bathroom goods.
But baths are also about invigoration. Again the theme is historically present from the late eighteenth century and associated with a Rousseauistic cult of nature, of breast feeding, of vigorous, hardened bodies and of cold baths (Vignarello, 1988) . The association is continued in the nineteenth, linked both with the public school cult of the healthy body and with nature cure. In the modern period, the theme of invigoration is most clearly evident not in relation to baths but showers, which are promoted in these terms.
Bathing is also located within a discourse of health. Sometimes it is health in the sense of medicine and in association with treatments, as in hydrotherapy and the medical spa tradition that continues to exist on the continent. But more commonly it is in association with wider ideas of health, of healthy living and of hygiene, before that word developed its current more specific connotations. Through the nineteenth century mineral bathing, showers, air and sun baths were all part of a wider cult of health associated with nature, with diet reform and a range of progressive social causes (Giedion, 1948; Twigg, 1981) . Many current ideas about bathing such as needle showers and pine preparations are distant echoes of the earlier health concerns.
Bathing was thus not confined to the domestic activity of getting clean but extended over a wide field that also encompassed sea baths, swimming baths, Turkish baths, sun baths. In their origins these various activities were not seen as essentially separate. Baths and bathing delineated a wide field. To this day there is some indeterminacy about the language of bathing, with 'bath' and 'bathe' only partly distinguished in spelling and pronunciation. These elisions once again remind us of the complexity of the meaning of bathing.
In general, debates about the 'social bath', where they do surface, do so within a narrow managerial discourse that treats bathing solely as a question of hygiene and of getting clean. Other dimensions are largely ignored. But failing to appreciate that baths have multiple functions and meanings can lead to confusion and error in service delivery. Seeing baths simply as a means of getting clean can, for example, lead to a false preoccupation with technological solutions, and a great deal of publicly provided bathing equipment is never used because it fails to address the full complex of meanings around bathing. It is sometimes assumed, for example, that installing showers will get round the difficulty that many older people have in getting in and out of a bath, but such assumptions ignore the ways in which the experience and meaning of a shower is very different from that of a bath. In a similar way the emphasis on hygiene ignores aspects of luxury and sensuality. Much bathing equipment is ugly and sometimes demeaning to use, and does not fit well with modern perceptions of the bathroom.
Although the area is one with considerable practical application, there has been little work that has attempted to explore the practices and preferences of older people in regard to bathing. As is clear from the historical account, many older working-class people were brought up with techniques of washing that did not rest on the current elision of washing and bathing. In an era before bathrooms were universally available and when heating water was expensive, other methods such as washing down in front of the sink were common. Baths were at best weekly events in many households into the fifties and sixties. The assumption made in some of the literature critical of current provision that frequent, even daily, baths are universally valued by older people may be wrong.
So far the discussion of washing and bathing has been concerned with these tasks as performed by individuals themselves. But a key aspect of the social bath is the fact that it is given to people: they are bathed. Within an institutional setting, baths can operate as rites of passage (van Gennep, 1960; V. W. Turner, 1969) . People when admitted to hospital are typically given a bath, and there are parallels in other institutional admissions to hostels, prisons, special schools (Littlewood, 1991; Fitzgerald and Sim, 1979) . Such baths, even in the case of the hospital, are not fully explained in terms of hygiene. They represent another of the cases where, as Douglas has argued in relation to eating, scientific rationalisations are deployed to legitimate ways in which the body is used symbolically and socially (Douglas, 1966 (Douglas, , 1973 . Bathing is part of a rite of passage, with the hospital bathroom representing an imposed liminal state between life outside as a citizen and inside as a patient. It is part of a more general stripping of identity prior to the adoption of a lesser, more anonymised, collective identity. As such it is one with practices such as cutting hair and imposing non-personalised clothing (Firth, 1973; Goffman, 1961) .
The context of these practices is an institutional one, where authority is exercised over the individual. Being given a bath at home is clearly different, and we shall explore why this is so more fully below when we examine the significance of the domestic setting. The institutional experience should however alert us to certain important parallels. Bathing is something that is done to people and as such involves an aspect of power. With its social as well as a literal stripping, it embodies processes whereby the individual can be made subject to the rationalities of the institution or the service.
To some degree individuals themselves use baths symbolically, as points of transition, for example between the worlds of work and of leisure, between day and night, night and morning, between ordinary life and special social events. Bathing as a rite of passage is thus not simply institutionally based, but available at a personal level as a marker of social states and transitions. Indeed, one of the reasons why bathing provision in the home is often unsatisfactory relates to these aspects of transition and timing. People do not want to have a bath in the middle of the morning or at other meaningless times, but at meaningful times, such the point of getting up or going to bed, when significant transitions take place. But it is exactly these times that it is difficult for a service to cover because they fall at the beginnings and ends of the working day and because they are personal to the individual and thus not easily incorporated into a rationalised work schedule.
T O U C H I N G
The empirical literature on touch has largely been concerned with rules regarding who may touch whom. Different parts of the body may be touched by different persons, and this reflects distinctions in relation to sexual and social intimacy (Jourard, 1966) . But touch is also associated with hierarchy and the expression of authority, with the powerful touching the less so, superiors touching inferiors. Touch is thus a vector of status, authority and dominance. There are gender differences in the reception of touch, with women more likely than men to be touched (Jourard and Rubin, 1968 ). This appears partly to reflect their inferior position within patriarchy (Henley, 1973) , but may also reflect a greater emphasis on tactility in the upbringing and culture of women. There is some evidence that while women evaluate touch by a service provider positively, men do not (Sussman and Rosenfeld, 1978; Whitcher and Fisher, 1979) . Whitcher and Fischer suggest that this is because men interpret touch as a sign of inferiority and dependence which they have been socialised to reject.
Apart from this social-psychological literature, there has been little detailed treatment of the subject of touch. What there is, however, is a pervasive view in the literature that modern Western society is peculiarly non tactile (Synott, 1993) . Contrasts are drawn with non-Western societies and with the historical past, both of which are perceived to be more tactile in character. Touch is thus drawn into the debates about modernity, with the decline of touching linked to the theme of the growing impersonality of modern society. Within a Weberian perspective, the retreat from the tactile represents a bodily version of the established themes of rationalisation and disenchantment.
Although it is hard to evaluate these claims adequately, there is some evidence to support the idea that there was more social touching in the past. In general, touch appears to have become narrower in its scope and more confined to sexual relations. Part of the difficulty in evaluating such claims lies in the fact that the literature itself reflects cultural shifts and preoccupations. Much of it dates from the 1970s, and its celebration of touch, of the bodily and the emotional as opposed to the cerebral and rational, is part of the periodic upsurge of neo-romanticist ideas, which in this period took the form of the counter culture and its wider cultural manifestations (Roszack, 1969; Campbell, 1987) .
The literature on touch has in general had little to say about the situation of older people. The bulk of this work is either about babies, stressing the importance of touch for thriving, or younger people (Montagu, 1971 (Montagu, , 1986 . This is despite the fact that there are reasons to think that the old are among the most deprived in terms of touch. Many older people have no close living relations who can be a focus for touching. The modern eroticisation of touch may affect them in particular, as partners die and there are few opportunities to establish new touching relations. At a service level there is also evidence of an absence of touch, with nurses more reluctant to touch older compared with younger patients (McCorkle and Hollenbach, 1984; Aguilera, 1967) .
The meaning of touch is also affected by its relation with employment. Touching work is, in general, lowly work. Within the care field there is a clear pattern whereby the more senior the profession or the grade of staff, the less likely the practitioner is to be directly involved in touching the patient. We can see this in the past in relation to the elite London physicians who did not actually handle the bodies of their patients. They might observe and diagnose, but did not condescend to touch; this was left to nurses or lower status practitioners (Heath, 1986) . Touch threat-ens care professionals with the status of the body servant. Part, though only part, of the low status of bone setters and osteopaths lay in the fact that they touched and manipulated the bodies of their patients. There is a recurring pattern in professionalisation whereby as an employment group establishes its body of theory and its status, so it retreats from manual labour and direct physical contact with the client. This tendency can be observed even in nursing where direct hands-on contact has always been a central part of the work. Dunlop criticises a dematerialising tendency in recent nursing literature in which the body becomes etherealised as the focus of concern moves from the physiological level to the -academically more promising -psycho-social. She notes how this has gone hand in hand with a progressive devaluation of physical care, which is increasingly delegated to lower orders in the nursing hierarchy (Dunlop, 1986) . The recent history of bathing in the community illustrates this, with the shift to skill mix in which tasks like bathing are relegated to unqualified staff (Lightfoot et al., 1992) .
The association of touch with lowly status is in contrast to the earlier account in terms of hierarchy and the expression of power. The tension is however resolvable once we recognise that in work with clients and patients both meanings are present: the service provider is dominant through touch, but also reduced in status by virtue of it. Here we can begin to see some of the social ambiguities that mark this field.
Lastly we turn to the question of payment and the position of touch in a commercial setting. Touch, because of its associations with closeness and relatedness, is generally seen as something apart from the commercial, for-purchase world of the economy. Individuals do buy forms of personal attention like hairdressing or beauty treatments that involve touching, but this is rarely an overt aspect of provision (though critics of the non-tactile nature of modern society argue that it underlies their appeal). The direct purchase of touching services, because of the elements of intimacy and relatedness inherent in touch, tends to be, if not taboo, at least located on the edges of the socially respectable, as the ambiguous position of massage illustrates. The one area of touch where purchase is openly accepted is in relation to alternative therapies, one of whose strongest unifying themes is the direct use of touch in both diagnosis and treatment (this is in contrast to the a-tactile character of dominant allopathic medicine that we noted earlier). In such cases the legitimacy of touch is in terms of medicine, or at least therapeutic intervention.
In relation to social care, however, the context is more problematic. Part of the difficulty that social care agencies have with the provision of bathing and other aspects of personal care arises from the absence of any commercial model of provision. To a significant degree, the communitycare needs that have traditionally been recognised and met by social care agencies are those that have had a prior existence within the formal economy. Certain needs, for example for meals or laundry, have proved relatively unproblematic to define and meet because there has been a pre-existing model for their public, social production. Housework has proved less easy to externalise as it cannot be taken out of the domestic sphere as meals and laundry can, but there has been a long established history of waged domestic labour (Gregson and Lowe, 1994 ) that underpins its provision in the public sector also. Personal care, of which bathing is an element, is however different. It has not traditionally been subject to this sort of commercial production; and that is one of the reasons why agencies have found its provision more ambiguous. The definition of personal care is that which an adult would normally expect to do for him or herself. It thus precisely delineates the aspects of daily life that are not externalised or commodified but that remain personal to the individual. There is no pre-existing commercial model of provision upon which social care agencies can draw; and the only available model, as we have seen is a medical one.
NA K E D N E S S
Nakedness has many and complex meanings both in terms of how it is experienced socially and in the metaphors that attach to it and to its representation (Clarke, 1956; Warner, 1985) . I will confine the account to the social experience of nakedness and to two themes in that: intimacy and vulnerability.
Nakedness is closely associated with intimacy, particularly in modern Western culture with sexual intimacy. The link between nakedness and closeness is both a literal one, in that nakedness permits direct physical touch and closeness, and a metaphorical one, in that to be naked is to divest oneself of protection and disguise. Nakedness creates vulnerability, and this takes on a particular character when the experience is asymmetrical. To be without your clothes in the context of those who are clothed is to be at a disadvantage. Denying prisoners or patients their clothes, interrogating people naked, are common techniques for undermining individuals and creating vulnerability. It is in order to mitigate such effects that doctors are taught how to examine patients in ways that limit their exposure.
Bathing in the community inevitably involves such nakedness in front of another who is clothed. For older people it may also involve a second form of asymmetry in the sense of being naked in front of someone who is young. Nearly all the representations of nakedness in modern culture are of youthful bodies. There are very few unclothed depictions of aging.
T H E M A NAG E M E N T O F T H E B O DY
Recent years have seen an upsurge of writing on the body across the social sciences and humanities (B. S. Turner, 1984 Turner, , 1991 Feher et al., 1989 , Freund, 1990 Synott, 1993; Shilling, 1993; Jordanova, 1989 , Falk, 1994 . The sources of the new concern with the body and embodiment are complex, and I will simply draw out three strands within this literature and suggest some of the ways they relate to the subject of the social bath.
Much of the current emphasis on the bodily within social science arises from a dissatisfaction with the dominant paradigm of Cartesian rationalism as transmitted through the concept of the rational actor. Turner delineates an oppositional tradition from Nietzsche to Foucault that rejects the assumptions of the Enlightenment project, criticising its emphasis on rationality and a disembodied concept of being and offering instead an account that emphasises desire, emotion and the life of the body (B. S. Turner, 1991) . Feminism has added a gendered dimension to this critique through its perception of the ways in which social science has privileged a narrow, masculine form of rationality. Other intellectual currents have also contributed, notably phenomenology with its emphasis on the life world and the experiential. The new concern with the body is therefore closely linked with a search for a fuller and more theoretically satisfactory account of social being, one that encompasses felt experience in the widest sense, incorporates the affective within social reality, as well as reflects the experience and fact of embodiment.
Much of the literature on the body is concerned with issues of representation. Drawing on the anthropological tradition, notably the work of Douglas (1966 Douglas ( , 1973 , it has explored the symbolism of the body and the way it is used to express the social and political order. In the recent upsurge of work within a postmodern perspective, there is a particular concern with the presentation and representation of the body: with fashion, with bodily display and manipulation, and with the cultural interpretation of these (Gains and Herzog, 1990; Finkelstein, 1991) .
The third strand in the literature on the body relates to the sociological observation that under the condition of high-or post-modernity, the body itself achieves a new significance, becoming a focus of identity and of self-expression. Modern societies, Featherstone, Giddens and others argue, are marked by a reflexive preoccupation with the body, exemplified in dieting, cosmetic surgery, exercise regimes, and reflected in advertising and the promotion of material goods (Bordo, 1992; Davis, 1995) . Through such preoccupations, the body itself has become a project to be worked upon: the ultimate, commodified, object of a consumer society (Giddens, 1992; Featherstone, 1991; Shilling, 1993; Falk, 1994) .
How does this literature relate to our understanding of the social bath? First we should note that social policy as a discipline is itself implicated in these debates; and it is within a social policy discourse that the social bath has primarily been analysed. Social policy in many ways epitomises the social science discourse that Foucault presents as emerging in the nineteenth century, with its emphasis on the classification of populations and of individuals, the division of the abnormal from the healthy, and the creation of systems of knowledge within which subgroups are defined and dominated (Rabinow, 1984; Merquior, 1985) . The historical subject matter of social policy -the poor law, the clinic, the penal institution -lie at the heart of this Foucauldian analysis, and social policy as a discipline -however self-critically -still bears some of the marks of this inheritance. Social policy has thus been part of the intellectual tradition against which Turner's oppositional thinkers have rebelled. This is particularly evident in its bureaucratic and rationalistic emphasis. What can broadly be termed the Fabian tradition in social policy is one of rationalistic amelioration in which factual analysis, rational planning and bureaucratic control are applied to social problems as defined by an administrative and intellectual elite (Mishra, 1989) . This tradition has not gone uncriticised within social policy, particularly of late, though the recent influx of managerialist thinking into the subject and the continuing influence of the direct funding of research by government have acted to reinforce the centrist, rationalistic bias of the subject. Social policy thus remains located within a rationalistic form of discourse in which issues of emotion, desire and embodiment have had little place.
If we turn to the ways in which the 'social bath' has been treated in the literature, we can see how it reflects just this sort of rationalistic, disembodied analysis. The literature on home care, home help, district nursing is almost exclusively concerned with managerial preoccupations such as rostering, substitution, costing, skill mix. Although personal care and the provision of bathing are acknowledged as areas of importance and to some degree confusion for service provision, there is almost no literature that actually addresses these issues. That it is a grey and difficult area is acknowledged in passing but not explored in any detail. Bathing is presented almost exclusively as a service boundary issue. As we saw in the earlier part of the article, it is a boundary issue, and one that lies across the main fault line of community care, but it is also much more, and it is these additional aspects that are -crucially -missing from the policy and managerial literature. Indeed, reading this literature, one would be hard put to gain a sense of what a bath in the community actually entails. The body and its social management is largely absent, bleached out from these forms of discourse. There is a gendered quality to the absence of discussion of the realities of care work. Managerial discourse is 'masculine' in character. It prizes abstraction; it aspires to the clear hard world of economic and statistical relationships and it shys away from any involvement with softer, more intimate, messier aspects of service provision. It is a literature and an approach that is happy to leave it to the nurses and the home care assistants to sort out what the work actually entails.
The recipients of bathing in the community are mainly older people. Recent work on the body, by contrast, has tended to focus on issues of sexuality, representation and commodification as they apply to younger people. Indeed protecting the 'sexiness' of the subject has seemed to require (with some exceptions (Featherstone and Hepworth, 1991) ), that the aged body be excluded from the field. Within social gerontology, the bodies of older people are also somewhat excluded, though in this case in order to avoid an oppressive identification of older people with physical failure and decline. As a result, however, there is very little literature that addresses directly how older people experience their bodies, or their feelings about them in relation to care. But these are central questions in both the experience of aging and the evaluation of service provision. A greater emphasis on user perspectives properly demands the incorporation of these aspects.
The new literature on the body opens up perspectives that deserve to be applied and explored more extensively in social policy. For example, much of the writing has been concerned with how bodies come to be gendered and the consequences of this for the social order. Many of the themes we have explored above -access to nakedness, touching, the management of the body in general -are embedded in such gendered assumptions, and this remains so despite the fact of age.
T H E V E N U E : H O M E The fact that the bath takes place in the home of the recipient is of central importance, affecting its meaning, and defining the range of interactions that are possible. Home is private territory, personal space, and these aspects endow the occupant with a degree of power. This, as we shall see, is in contrast with the world of the hospital or the institution.
The modern ideology of home has its roots in the nineteenth century with the development of urban life and the emergence of the public/private divide. This intensified the significance of home and encouraged an ideology of domesticity in which home became the focus of family life, a place of relaxation, privacy and control, a secure haven against the hostile world of work; though this experience was in some degree gendered: for women home was as much a place of work as of leisure, and its privacy a source of isolation as well as personal control. These developments have intensified in the postwar era with material prosperity underwriting an increasingly privatised life style among all classes in which the home is the main site of leisure and self-expression (Crow, 1989) .
Home has particular significance for many older people. In a context of growing physical or mental frailty, it is a familiar environment where the individual has confidence in his or her capacity to manage. Being and feeling at home means behaving as you wish without fear of observation or rebuke. As Sixsmith argues, it is the material source of independence and personal control (Sixsmith, 1990) . It allows older people to manage as they wish and not according to some professional model of coping. Home is also private space where visitors come only by invitation. Restricting access both in terms of time and areas of the house allows individuals to control the presentation of their lives. Home is also an important source of identity, a material expression of the self and of memories. To lose these or to suffer their radical rearrangement under the direction of care professionals is to lose an aspect of oneself.
The significance of home can be illustrated by looking at the key site of contrast -the hospital ward. Wards are public space even though they are not open to the public as such. The public nature of the space relates to the access of professionals, of non-kin, non-friends -of relationships that have no private quality to them and that do not rest on the capacity of the individual to exclude. There is almost no real personal space on a ward. Lockers are limited in scope and possessions tidied away. Even on long-stay wards where the hospital is the patient's 'home', few manage to retain any real possessions: whole lives are reduced to a piece of soap and tin of talc. The curtains around the bed allow for modesty, but do not create any real private space. Patients on the ward are open to professional scrutiny, subject to the medical gaze. Observations are taken, recorded, rationalised; and not only of physical functioning but also of emotional state and social functioning. The ward is a total environment. All aspects of the patient's life become subject to its totalising gaze: food becomes nutrition, visits become social support. There is no boundary here between the medical and the social. All aspects of life become part of the condition or of the treatment. The social has no independent existence. That is why there can be no such thing as a 'social bath' on a ward. The category makes no sense in this totalising environment.
Home by contrast can never be wholly under the control of professionals, and the ideology of home endows older people with a degree of power. This power is all the greater because the norms of privacy, autonomy and identity embodied in the home are shared by service providers and indeed applied by them to their own lives. As a result, practitioners operating in the domestic setting are more constrained by their own values than when operating in clinical or institutional settings. The generalised power to exclude strangers extends to the power to exclude professionals. Older people living at home do not have to accept help. They can shut the door on the social worker. Once inside, the service provider is only there on sufferance and can use the equipment and facilities of the home only with permission. The power to refuse certain sorts of treatment is all the stronger by virtue of the fact that the older person is surrounded by the emblems of their identity and history. It is easier to resist medical dominance where the social world is manifestly present in their surroundings and possessions than it is in the anonymous, depersonalised world of the ward. This is why certain practices are possible in an institution that become no longer so once the patient is living in his or her own home. For example, it was commonplace in the past for hysterectomies to be performed on young women with learning disabilities or mental health problems living in institutions. That is no longer possible. The law as such has not changed; consent to such interventions was probably never valid (Gunn, 1987; Law Commission, 1991) , but the setting was sufficiently powerful and all embracing to render such considerations unnecessary. In a similar way medication was commonly imposed on mental health patients who were not subject to a Section but who were living in the hospital and had no social resources to refuse. The shift to community care has made these practices difficult. So too it is likely to be with washing and bathing. So long as these tasks take place in the clients' home, they are in some degree in control, and this aspect of power is part of the reason why the 'social bath' is a grey area for community nursing that cannot be subsumed wholly under the medical gaze as it can in the hospital ward.
C O N C L U S I O N
The 'social bath' is a key site for the analysis of community care, encapsulating as it does a series of political and analytic issues. Bathing as we have seen lies across the principal fault line of community care: that between the medical and the social. It is thus at the centre of current tensions within the care system. Traditionally located in an area of discretion, it has increasingly been exposed to view by developments in service delivery. The sharpening of the medical/social divide, the new emphasis on managerial specificity and the transparency created by the purchaser/ provider split have all conspired to put bathing on the public agenda. A vacuum of responsibility has opened out. Is bathing something that is best provided within a medical framework with all the consequences for payment, responsibility and philosophy of care that that implies, or is it better seen within a social perspective? Who should touch the bodies of the old? Bathing also raises questions as to the meaning and remit of the welfare state. How far are such aspects of physical care a private matter? Is social care part of public provision?
But the 'social bath' also challenges some of the traditional ways in which community care has been analysed. Although at one level a mundane, commonsense activity, bathing entails aspects of being and of social exchange that are from simple. Intimacy, constraint, the ambiguities of physiological life: though such themes resonate through the subject, they are not reflected in the academic and policy literature. Social policy has traditionally approached community care in a disembodied way, reflecting the rationalistic and bureaucratic biases of policy-makers. As a result a large part of the social reality of community care is missing. Part of the purpose of this article has been to put these wider aspects back in.
